# COMIREX Hand 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/51/68 ECIA-RDP79B01709A000800030002-0 COMIREX-M-69 17 April 1969 COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION COMIREX-M-69 17 April 1969 The following is an index of the Minutes of the 17 April 1969 COMIREX meeting: Section I (Briefings and Reports on Operations) Operational Briefing -- Satellite Page 4 Report on Aircraft Activities -- Far East 4 Report on Aircraft Activities -- Cuba Section II (NPIC Report) None 69 Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports) Report from Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy 9 Page Working Group 25X1D Section IV (Action Items) Selective Target Printing (STP) 25X1 Page 11 Installation Data File: Input of Third-Phase Exploitation Page 11 Information (COMIREX-D-32, 4/3) Problems Encountered in Selecting Targets for High Page 12 Level Drone Coverage of South China Review of Adequacy of Photographic Coverage of China Page 12 as Related to the Need to Justify Manned Overflight DIA review(s) completed. 25X1A 25X1A

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Tab B - High Resolution Coverage of North Vietnam

DATE MISSION NO.

AREAS/TARGETS RESULTS


Cam Pha Port, Hon
Gai Port, Kep Afld,
Kep RR Yd, Phuc
Yen Afld, Viet Tri RR
Yd, Yen Bai, Dien
Bien Phu
Fair

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4. In reporting on the following BUMPY ACTION activities from 11-17 April, observed that the two high-level missions launched had been recovered while two of the three low-level missions were lost.

## BUMPY ACTION ACTIVITIES

DATE	MISSION NO.	AREAS/TARGETS	RESULTS
12 Apr	Q502A (Low)	Hanoi Port Fac, Gia Lam Afld, Yen Vien RR Yd	Lost
13 Apr	Q526A (Low)	SAM 73, Phuc Yen Afld, Hanoi Port Fac	MARS
14 Apr	Q532A (Low)	Hon Gai Port Fac, Haiphong Port Fac, Kien An Afld, Nam Dinh TPP, Thanh Hoa TSP, Seg Rte 1A	MARS
14 Apr	Q503 (Low)	Rte 15, Vinh Son Compl	MARS
14 Apr	Q900 (High)	NVN Comm Rtes, SAM Teo Afld, Na San Afld, Ban Ko Kieng	MARS
16 Apr	Q901 (High)	Rte 15, Na San Afld	MARS
17 Apr	Q537 (Low)	Haiphong Port Fac	Lost

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- 5. reported efforts to satisfy two priority South China/North Vietnam requirements as follows:
  - a. Specific targets pertinent to Coverage of Lines of Communications (LOC) most likely to be used for the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966) are identified by underlining in Tab A. The number of LOC priority targets in South China and North Vietnam remains at 352. For the period 10-16 April 1969, surveillance coverage was reported on eight priority targets in North Vietnam.
  - Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967, and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 3-9 April 1969. Two BUMPY ACTION missions flown during this time period and considered successful have not been reported. No SSM activity was observed.

Report on Aircraft Activities -- Cuba

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submitted the following report of GLASS LAMP toverage in the 9-17 April period:

DATE	MISSION NO.	RESULTS
9 Apr	g078	Successful, 6.5% coverage
ll Apr	G079	Successful, 21.7% coverage
12 Apr	G080	Successful, 14.1% coverage
16 Apr	G081	Unknown

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# GLASS LAMP ACTIVITIES

9 - 17 Apr 1969

### RECAP

<u>DA'TE</u>	MISSION NO.	NET	CUMULATIVE
9 Apr	G078	6.5%	21.5%
ll Apr	G079	21.7%	35.8%
12 Apr	G080	14.1%	41.8%

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7. invited COMIREX attention to the fact that GLASS LAMP appears to be encountering difficulty returning to the previous 90 percent coverage level. He then reported that for the 56-day period beginning 20 February 1969 eleven GLASS LAMP missions were flown over Cuba and provided 87 percent coverage of the area. During this period 165 of the 175 targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography, not including the four most recent missions flown on 5, 9, 11, and 12 April.

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Approved For Belease 2004/01/08: Start 79B01799A000800030002-0 25X1A 25X1A COMIREX-M-69 17 April 1969 Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports) Some material presented by Subcommittee and Working Group Chairmen at the time they are called on to make their reports is reported elsewhere in the Minutes, Action Items in Section IV for instance, and is not repeated in this section.) Report from Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Working Group 25X1 1. reported that his Working Group has 25X1A been asked by of the NRO to make a preliminary study of the possibility of the U. S. Army Topographic Command (TOPOCOM) servicing requests for copies 25X1A after initial processing. The Chairman remarked that this might be one way of cutting down on 25X1 complaints about damage to imagery during processing. said this could be true except that some of the damage occurred in initial processing. He indicated, however, that he thinks this problem has been taken care of with Eastman Kodak.

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	COMIREX-M-69 17 April 1969	25X1A 25X1
	Installation Data File: Input of Third-Phase Exploitation Information (COMIREX-D-32.4/3)	25X1
	4. In his introduction of the question of inclusion of third-phase information in the Installation Data File, reported that his Working Group had reached the general conclusion that a significant portion of the information included in phase three	25X1
25X1	reports is not compatible with IDF computers, unless imagery is included. In this context, observed that much of the detailed information he has in mind was processed out of a computer in the first place. The Chairman, DBWG, pointed to the "conclusions and recommendations" in paragraph 18 on page 9 and admitted that the recommendation that DBWG examine the question of the inclusion of graphics is an interim	
25X1	evasion of this issue. requested, however, that COMIREX approve the other actions contained in the recommendations.	

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Approved For Belease 2004/07/15 ECRET DP79B01789A000800030002-0 COMIREX-M-69 25X1A 17 April 1969 Following agreement to some editorial changes, 5. requested by the Acting Army member, COMIREX approved the paper. /Revised paper distributed as COMIREX-D-32.4/3A, 25 April 1969./ Problems Encountered in Selecting Targets for High Level Drone Coverage of South China 6. The Acting Chairman, ICRS, reported that his Subcommittee had encountered some problems deciding whether, in planning drone coverage of South China, the 90 key targets should be given the same priority or if there should be an attempt to divide them into two priorities. then reported that 25X1A he was hopeful a solution would be arrived at before the end of the week so that he could provide guidance to JRC via DIA. In response to a question from the Chairman, noted that the present 25X1A requirements guidance seems adequate for exploitation purposes and he anticipates no problems in readout. Review of Adequacy of Photographic Coverage of China as Related to the Need to Justify Manned Overflight The Chairman referred to Minutes of the 11 March 7. meeting of the 303 Committee with particular regard to the decision to delay consideration of U-2 reconnaissance and to require a strong intelligence justification at such time as another request might be submitted. [ observed that under the present circumstances, when it appears that U-2 coverage should be considered to satisfy approved intelligence requirements consistently left uncovered by satellites, the type of justification requested appears rather tough. U-2 sorties would probably be infrequent and the situation quite different, therefore, to a few years ago when missions were frequent and special justification was required following an "incident". The State Department member reported that he felt quite certain that such justifications would be required. The Chairman then suggested that, as a preliminary to forwarding another request for U-2 coverage, the community keep a careful record of coverage of priority targets achieved by satellites and drones for the next two or three months. This record might provide us with a valid basis for judging the need for U-2 missions to supplement satellite coverage. 25X1A 12

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COMIREX-M-69 17 April 1969	25X 25X
Consideration of Need to Review or Revise Requirements for North Vietnam (COMIREX-M-67, page 16)	
13. At the request of the Chairman, reviewed informally some of the problems which he believes COMIREX faces in	25X
any attempt to tackle the problem of the North Vietnam requirements	
any attempt to tackle the problem of the North Vietnam requirements at this point in time. In essence, felt that a rewrite of the requirements would be unrealistic. The present requirements are probably all valid even though they are never met in terms of outstanding demands for frequency of coverage. In this connection, Mr. Moyer noted that even in the period before the bombing standdown,	25X
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the requirements review be made without consideration of the deployment of additional assets, it seems questionable whether a new requirement paper would serve any useful purpose at this time. The Department of State member suggested that if a COMIREX analysis of coverage is needed at this juncture, it might be interesting to evaluate current performance against the situation existing before the bombing halt. Mr. Moyer cautioned however that the use of collection assets in this area will likely be controlled by the climate of the current political situation rather than by specific requirements statements. In conclusion, the Chairman summarized his preference as being the need to convey the message of the importance of low level tactical reconnaissance and suggested that perhaps we should try to confine our paper to that message.

Information Required for DBWG to Prepare Quarterly Resource Report

reported to the Chairman that he had not as 15. yet received all the information necessary to produce the quarterly requested members to give this their resource report. immediate attention. The Chairman added that his memory was that the Minutes (COMIREX-M-65, page 18, para 6) had been very specific in specifying continuing support to DBWG so that it could produce this report.

Support of Special Projects Office (Department of the Interior) at Reston

reported that MCGWG might be able to 16. conclude on the Reston requirements at the meeting on 22 April. If this is accomplished, it may be possible to present a paper for COMIREX consideration on 1 May.

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25X1A Approved For Release 2000 186 CREA-RDP79B01709A000800030002-0 COMIREX-M-69 25X1A 17 April 1969 Section VI (Other Business) 25X1D Planning Factors for the Exploitation of Reconnaissance Imagery: National Reconnaissance Program, FY 1970-1974 (COMIREX-D-31.1/3A) 25X1 25X1A had also reported that 2. 25X1A advised that agreement has been reached as to what essential information from the "planning factors for exploitation" memorandum, and the tabs to that memorandum, may be released in the TALENT-KEYHOLE compartment. It is the understanding of the Executive Secretary that tabs suitable for release will be forwarded to the Chairman's office. 25X1A Executive Secretary Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation Attachments Tabs A & B

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
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
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
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
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
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
#### COMIREX-M-69 17 April 1969 PRIORITY 2 TARGETS IN SOUTH CHINA (CONTINUED) Tab A 25X1A COMIREX LAST BASELINE 25X1A NUMBER NAME - WAC-BE COORDINATES COVERAGE KUN MING/WU CHIA PA AIRFIELD 245931N1024437E 25X1A CHIA LAI SHIH AIRFIELD 194152N1094344E 25X1A SAN CHOU SHIH NAV FAC SHANG CHUA 214458N1124610E 25X1A CHING LAN MTB 193358N1104855E 25X1A PET HAT NAVAL FACILITY 212913N1090419E 25X1A HSIN-HSING NAVAL FACILITY 195358N1093112E AN SHUN MILITARY STORAGE AREA 261535N1055645E CHANG MU TUU ARMY BKS WEST AL 1 225340N1140122E CHANG NING HSIN HSU ARMY BKS AL 231335N1140230E 25X1A CHANG NING HSIN HSU ARMY BKS AL 231552N1140445E 25X1A CHANG CHI ARMY BKS SOUTH AL 1 234246N1165257E 25X1A CHAO AN ARMY BKS AL 1 234108N1163717E 25X1A CHIANG CHENG ARMY BKS AL 1 223530N1015200E 25X1 25X1A CHU CHING ARMY BKS NORTH AL-1 253053N1034747E 25X1₽ HSIA KUAN HQ 42 INF DIV AND BKS 253520N1001314E 25X1A PU ARMY SUPPLY DEPOT E LL 230612N1132607E 25X1A YANG HU 42 ARMY AND BKS AL 1 230522N1142321E 25X1A YANG TRAINING AREA 231132N1140233E 25X1A


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
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
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
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








# High Resolution Coverage of North Vietnam



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